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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 20209 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE Of THE CASE 
Defendants-Appellants appeal friom two judgments of 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah wherein the plaintiff who brought 
an action for unlawful detainer was granted restitution 
of the premises located at 1433 South Main, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and were further granted judgment for damages in 
the sum of $8,533.00, which were treblpd. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Wholesale Tire Distributors, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall hereinafter be referred 
to as "Wholesale" or as "Respondent." Main Street Tire, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall hereinafter be referred 
to as "Main Street." Roy Henderson and Janis Henderson 
shall be referred to as "Henderson," "Hendersons" or 
"Henderson Partnership" or "Appellant." Pat Billis, Mike 
Billis, and Richard Goodhand will be referred to by their 
full name or "Appellants." 
"TR" shall refer to a page in the Transcript of proceed-
ings in the lower court. "Ex." refers to a specific exhibit 
received into evidence by the lower court and "R" shall 
refer to the page number in the record of the lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The Court granted 
restitution of certain premises to the Respondent and granted 
the Respondent judgment for damages in the sum of $8,533.33, 
which said damages were trebled for a total judgment of 
$24,000.00 less any amounts paid by the Appellants on the 
underlying Trust Deeds. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek to reverse the aforesaid judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
-2-
County, State of Utah, in its entirelty and seek an order 
finding that Respondent's Trust Deed is void and quieting 
title to the subject property in the Appellants, Pat Billis 
and Richard Goodhand. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUBS 
The following issues are presented by Appellants for 
review: 
A. Whether or not the the lower court erred in finding 
that the title of the Plaintiff, Wholesale Tire Distributors, 
Inc. was superior to that of the Appellants, Pat Billis, 
Mike Billis and Richard Goodhand. 
B. That with regard to A above did the Court error 
in not finding the following: 
1. That there was no meeting of the minds as between 
the Respondent Wholesale and Roy and Janis Henderson with 
regard to the Trust Deed. 
2. That there was insufficient consideration to support 
the giving of the Trust Deed to Wholesale by Henderson. 
3. That there was no delivery of the subject Trust 
Deed and that it was Henderson's intention that only an 
unconditional delivery be made to Wholesale. 
C. Whether the court erred in imposing treble damages 
and at the same time allowing offsets for payments made 
by certain of the Appellants for the benefit of Respondent. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, Wholesale Tire Distributors, Inc., 
is an entity located in Salt Lake City, Utah, and deals 
in the sale of tires and tire accessories to retail outlets 
in the state of Utah. (TR-9) Roy Henderson and his wife 
Janis Henderson were the major stockholders of an entity 
known as Roy Henderson Tires, Inc. which owned a retail 
tire outlet located at 1433 South Main, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (TR-87) John La Roe was the comptroller and the credit 
manager of Wholesale and was responsible for monitoring 
the accounts receivable for Wholesale. (TR-8) Mr. La Roe 
first became acquainted with Roy Henderson when Roy Henderson 
Tires, Inc. became a Uniroyal dealer although that entity 
had had an account with Wholesale for sometime previous 
to that date. (TR-9) 
Through their normal credit procedure, Wholesale had 
obtained various credit forms from Henderson, including 
a credit application, a security form which allows the 
retention of title of tires, a UCC-1 filing and a personal 
guarantee from Roy Henderson and his wife. (TR-9-10) 
In January, 1983, Roy Henderson Tire, Inc., hereinafter 
referred to as "Henderson Tire'1 owed Wholesale approximately 
$33,000.00 and according to normal credit procedure was 
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expected to pay at least $10,500.00 on January 10
 r 1984. 
Since Henderson Tire was unable to make the payment and 
because of the amount owed, Wholesale needed an extended 
or more detailed personal guarantee fjrom the Hendersonsand 
also asked to see the books and recprds of the business. 
(TR-10 & 11, 104 & 105) 
On or about January 20, 198 3, Henderson brought the 
books and records to Wholesale for review. After review 
of those books, Wholesale determined that Henderson had 
a very serious cash flow problem and on that basis asked 
him for additional security to secure the amount of the 
indebtedness. (TR-12 & 13) 
At the end of January, Wholesale and Henderson met 
with a man by the name of Jeff Stringham, an officer of 
Bountiful Valley Bank, in an attempt to secure a loan for 
Henderson in order to solve his cash flow problem. Valley 
Bank would not loan Henderson the moi|iey but Stringham knew 
a fellow at Western Heritage Thrift and Loan by the name 
of Scott Baker who possibly could make such a loan. (TR-13 
& 14) 
Subsequently, on the 9th day of February, 1983, Hender-
son met with Scott Baker but once ag^in his loan was turned 
down. (TR-14) When Larry Nichols, Plresident of Wholesale, 
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found out that the loan had been turned downr Henderson 
was once again asked for additional collateral in the form 
of a Trust Deed to the property where the Henderson Tire 
store was located. It was at that time that Wholesale 
also presented Henderson with a list of demands which 
included the following: 
A. Trust Deed on property; 
B. To cosign on all checks; 
C. Verify inventory, sales and deposits daily; 
D. Pay daily for any decrease in our (Wholesale inven-
tory) ; 









(TR-18, 19, & 20, 71; & Ex. 10P) 
In response to Wholesale's list of demands, Henderson 
had his attorney prepare certain documents which he picked 
up from his attorney on or about the 25th day of February, 
1983 and delivered those documents to John La Roe at the 
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Wholesale offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. (TR-94, 45, 
46f & 47; Ex. IP, 13D, 14D & 17D) 
Exhibit 13D was a letter dated Flebruary 24, 1983 from 
Roy Henderson to Wholesale Tires, Inc. The letter was 
set up as a letter agreement which was signed by Roy Hender-
son and required the signature of Wholesale as accepting 
the terms of the letter agreement. The terms set out in 
the letter were as follows: 
"This letter will outline oup agreement 
whereby my wife and I have agreed to grant 
you a secured position in the real estate 
where Roy Henderson Tire is lco^ted at 1433 
South Main. In return you havb agreed to 
accept payments on the outstanding sum owed 
to you by Roy Hendrson Tire in the amount 
of $500 per week commencing Friday, March 
4, 1983, and each week thereafter, said 
amount to be reflected in a promissory note 
signed by me personally. Interest shall 
accrue at the rate of 12% per annum. 
"Additionally, in consideration olf the trans-
fer of the security interest in the aforesaid 
real estate, you will grant to the corporation 
an additional $2,000 of credit for the pur-
chase of additional inventory by Roy Henderson 
Tire Company." 
The letter was signed by Roy Hender|son as president. It 
should be noted that the 12% interejst figure was crossed 
out and 18% was entered by interliemation and Hendersonfs 
intials were placed by the change. (Ex> 13P) 
Exhibit 17D is a hypothecation agreement which was 
signed by Roy Henderson and Janis fienderson. Exhibt 14D 
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was an undated promissory note signed by Roy Henderson 
in the principal sum of $27,018.50. The face amount of 
the promissory note of $27,018.50 conformed to the amount 
reflected in the Trust Deed which is Exhibit IP and was 
also given to John La Roe with the other three documents. 
The Trust Deed was also undated. 
The Trust Deed referred to a promissory note in the 
principal sum of $27,018.50, however, that had been scratched 
out three and the figure $30,000.00 had been inserted at 
the request of John La Roe. (TR-98) Mr. La Roe in his 
testimony indicated that the change may have been to accommo-
date a credit limit of $30,000, however, he further testified 
that at no time was the additional credit ever extended 
since Henderson had been on COD for a rather substantial 
period of time. (TR-39) 
The Trust Deed was in the possession of Mr. La Roe 
until the following day at which time he gave it to another 
employee of Wholesale to have it recorded. It was not 
recorded, however, until the 1st day of March, 1983. (TR-23, 
24; Ex. IP) 
La Roe testified that he could accept the Trust Deed 
on behalf of Wholesale but could not accept the letter 
agreement which placed conditions upon the tender of the 
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deed nor could he accept the terms of the promissory note. 
(TR-43) Henderson's testimony indicated that La Roe would 
have to get authority from "Nichols111 in order to accept 
the letter agreement and the promiissory note. La Roe, 
however, did indicate that in all probability that neither 
the interest nor the payments provided for in the Promissory 
Note and letter would be acceptable to Nichols, the President 
of Wholesale. But La Roe did reiterate to Henderson that 
he did not have authority to approve of reject the documents. 
(TR-4 9) 
Shortly thereafter Henderson tpgether with employees 
of Wholesale including Mr. Nichols then went on a trip 
to Hawaii. They returned on or about the 7th day of March, 
1983. (TR-52) It was only after the return from Hawaii 
that Mr. Nichols was made aware of the promissory note 
and letter agreement and simply rejected them out of hand. 
(TR-85) As far as Nichols was concermed the list of demands 
which was set out in Exhibit 10 were the minimum terms 
acceptable to Wholesale. (TR-79) 
Then, immediately after their return from Hawaii, 
Wholesale demanded that Henderson pay $5,000 as one of 
the required payments of the list of demands. It being 
the only payment schedule which was acknowledged by Whole-
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sale. (TR-52) However, at the time the demand was made 
Wholesale considered Henderson to be in default because 
he had not made the payments according to the list of demands 
schedule and further considered Henderson in default at 
the time John La Roe received the Trust Deed from Henderson. 
(TR-52 & 53) 
In response to the demand for the payment of $5,000.00 
Henderson paid La Roe $500.00. He held also made $500 pay-
ments on February 9, 1983, February 22, 1983 and February 
24, 1983. (TR-29 & 30) 
When Henderson realized that Wholesale would not accept 
his payment proposal and required the $5,000 payments, 
he called La Roe and told him to come pickup the tire inven-
tory. Shortly thereafter, La Roe and other employees of 
Wholesale picked up the inventory purchased from Wholesale 
which constituted approximately 70% of Henderson's total 
inventory. This made it impossible for Henderson to stay 
in business. (TR-30; TR-97) 
Henderson testified that he had not authorized the 
Deed of Trust to be filed without Wholesale accepting the 
Promissory Note and things specified in the letter. (TR-96 
& 97) And when he discovered that the Trust Deed had been 
filed, even though they had picked up the inventory, Hender-
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son called La Roe and told him that there wasn't a deal. 
Henderson indicated to La Roe that "If the Trust Deed was 
filed, then the whole thing should have been accepted." 
But it was not. (TR-97 & 98) 
On or about the 1st day of May, 1983, the Henderson 
partnership which owned the business property leased the 
store to an entity known as Main Street Tire, Inc. which 
was owned by Appellant, Michael A. Billis and Patricia 
Billis. That entity maintained possession of the business 
premises either as Main Street Tireif Inc. or through a 
subtenant until the completion of the lawsuit in the lower 
court. (Ex. 19P) On or about the 21st day of December, 
1983, defendants, Mike Billis, Pat BijLlis and Richard Good-
hand purchased the real property alnd tire shop located 
at 1433 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah from the Henderson 
Partnership. (TR-102) At the time of the sale, neither 
the Billises nor Richard Goodhand wer^ aware that Henderson 
had given Wholesale a Trust Deed nor had Henderson advised 
them that Wholesale had filed a Notice of Default on October 
27, 1983. (TR-103 & Ex. 5P) 
Contemporaneously with the filing of Wholesale's notice 
of default, Wholesale filed a substitution of trustee. 
(Ex. 4P) On the 30th day of January, Wholesale prepared 
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its Notice of Trustee's Sale which established February 
3, 1984 as the date scheduled for said sale. (Ex. 6P) 
The sale was held on the 3rd day of February, 1984, at 
which time Wholesale purchased the property for the sum 
of $21,219.81. A Trustees Deed was then issued on or about 
the 2nd day of March, 1984. (Ex. 4P) The defendants, Pat 
and Mike Billis and Richard Goodhand all attended the sale 
and objected to it. (TR-35) 
On the 2nd day of March, Wholesale prepared and subse-
quently served a Notice to Quit on Pat Billis, Mike Billis, 
Richard Goodhand and other defendants. Those defendants 
remained in the premises as stated above until the suit 
in the lower court had been completed. It should be noted, 
however, that at all times pertinent hereto the Defendants 
in possession subject property cooperated with the Plaintiff 
to bring the matter before the Court on an excelerated 
basis. (R-38) And after the Court had entered its Minute 
Entry of July 31, 1984, Defendants, by and through their 
attorney agreed to the partial judgment and order granting 
restitution of the property to the Plaintiff. (R-91) 
The Court entered two judgments—the first granted 
restitution of the subject property to the Plaintiff, Whole-
sale. The second which was entered several weeks later 
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awarded the Plaintiff damages at a rate of $1,600.00 per 
month trebled for a total judgment of $24,000.00. The 
judgment, however, granted an offset to the Defendants, 
Pat Billis, Mike Billis and Richard Goodhand based on their 
payments to underlying holders of superior trust deeds. 
(R-99-101 & R-120-122) Defendants then filed objections 
to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment which in part were upheld and changes appropriately 
reflected in the corrected findings ot£ fact and conclusions 
of law and judgment and certain oj the objections were 
rejected by the lower court. (R-92-93) 
The court below found that Wholesale's claim to the 
property was superior to that of all other defendants. 
It further found that plaintiff Wholesale was entitled 
to restitution of the premises and for damages for unlawful 
detainer of $600.00 per month for 5 molnths which said damages 
were trebled "as provided by law." The court further held 
that the defendants were entitled to offsets against the 
judgment in sums paid on the underlying mortgage. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court below found that the Plaintiff and Respon-
dent's claim to certain real property to be superior to 
that of Defendants, Pat Billis, Mifce Billis, and Richard 
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Goodhand, who derived their title through a purchase from 
Roy Henderson and Janis Henderson. Wholesale obtained 
their title through a non-judicial trustee's sale based 
on an alleged default on the part of Roy and Janis Henderson 
of a trust deed wherein Wholesale was the beneficiary. 
The arguments presented below will indicate that the 
subject Trust Deed should fail based on the fact that when 
the Trust Deed was presented to agents of Wholesale it 
was presented with certain other documents which all consti-
tuted an offer by Henderson to enter into a contract and 
that the offer was never properly accepted by Wholesale. 
Additionally, Appellants will argue that the Trust 
Deed is invalid since there was no meeting of the minds 
as between the Hendersons and Wholesale in that the terms 
and conditions upon which Henderson was making his offer 
and those acceptable to Wholesale were entirely different--so 
different as to make an agreement impossible. 
Appellants will also argue that the Trust Deed fails 
for lack of consideration and for lack of delivery. The 
former is argued on the basis that the record is devoid 
of any evidence relating to consideration which would support 
the subject Trust Deed. The position that there was a 
lack of delivery is based on the fact that delivery of 
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the Trust Deed to the agent of Wholesale was conditional 
at best and that at no time did Hendbrson intend that the 
delivery requirements be satisfied by delivery of the Trust 
Deed to Wholesale's agent John La Roe. 
Finally, Appellants would argue that since the Defen-
dants were paying monthly payments to underlying Trust 
Deed holders which ultimately benefited Wholesale and for 
which the Defendants were granted a right of offset, that 
the offset should have come before the damages were trebled. 
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POINT I 
THE PRESENTATION OF THE TRUST DEED, PROMISSORY 
NOTE, HYPOTHECATION AGREEMENT AND LETTER 
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED AN OFFER BY HENDERSON 
WHICH REQUIRED AN ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART 
OF WHOLESALE BEFORE A CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
On February 25, 1984, the subject Deed of Trust which 
Roy Henderson and Janis Henderson proposed to give as col-
lateral security to Wholesale was presented to an agent 
of that entity (John La Roe) who had no authority to bind 
his principal (Wholesale). The Deed of Trust was also 
accompanied by certain other documents which were, with 
the Trust Deed, to Comprise one transaction as far as the 
Hendersons were concerned. 
The transaction which was proposed by the Hendersons 
can be seen explicitly from the three primary documents 
in question. Those documents being the Trust Deed, the 
Promissory Note and Letter Agreement. (Ex. IP, Ex. 13D 
& 14D) Together they constituted an offer by the Hendersons 
to collateralize an antecedent debt of Roy Henderson Tire, 
Inc. on specific terms set out in the Promissory Note and 
Letter Agreement. 
Larry Nichols, the President of Wholesale, was the 
only individual who could accept such an offer and as he 
testified the offer was "rejected out-of-hand." (TR-85) 
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It is basic that to be a contract any transaction 
including the giving of a trust deed or mortgage must include 
the essential elements of an offer and acceptance. As 
in Thornton v. Paschey 139 P. 2d 1Q02, 104 Utah 313, an 
instrument stated that a trucker woiild do certain things 
and the instrument was signed by the trucker. The court 
held that the transaction undertaken by the trucker was 
at least an "offer" but before it became a contract the 
offerees would have to accept. See also Hogan v. Aluminum 
Lock Shingle Corp of America, 329 P. 2d 271, 214 Or. 218. 
Certainly Roy and Janis Henderson had signed the docu-
ments but the Record is clear that there was no acceptance 
on the part of the offerees (Wholesale). 
Of course, John La Roe, Wholesale's agent, did have 
the Trust Deed filed but that was dolne without Hendersons1 
authorization and that action would clearly constitute 
an attempt on the part of La Roe or Wholesale to vary the 
terms of Hendersons1 offer and "in order to meet the require-
ments of acceptance," any acceptance by offerees to a pro-
posed contract must be unconditional otherwise the offeree 
is simply making a counter offer. ^illiams v. Espey, 358 
P. 2d 903, 11 Utah 2d 317. 
There being no acceptance of t\\e offer there was no 
contract and the Trust Deed is a nullity and the subsequent 
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Trustee Sale of the subject property to Wholesale must 
fail and be set aside. 
POINT II 
THE DEED OF TRUST IS INVALID AND NOT BINDING 
SINCE THERE WAS NO ASSENT OR MEETING OF 
MINDS AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE DOCUMENT. 
Generally it is essential to the formation of any 
contract that there be a meeting of minds of the parties 
to the contract and they (the parties) must have arrived 
at sufficient understanding as to the terms of a contract 
so that they know what they will be bound to do. Ef co 
Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615, 17 Utah 2d 
375; Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P. 2d 427, 12 Utah 2d 61. 
To find whether or not a meeting of minds exist the 
Court must look to the conduct of the parties and the circum-
stances surrounding the subject transaction. Valcarce 
v. Billers, supra; E.B. Wicks Company v. Moyle, 137 P. 
2d 342, 103 Utah 554; and Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P. 2d 597, 
13 Utah 2d 83. 
The evidence here indicates that sometime in January 
Wholesale through Mr. Nichols presented his proposal or 
offer to Henderson. (Ex. 10P) That proposal required Hender-
son to deliver a trust deed on property, allow co-signature 
authority to Wholesale on company checks, provided for 
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verification of inventory, sales and deposits on a daily 
basis, required payment of daily decrease in inventory, 
provided for the trade overstocked merchandise, and finally 
required six payments between February 7, 1983 and March 
20, 1983. 
Hendersons, on the other hand, proposed terms which 
were substantially different than tthose seen above and 
were presented to Wholesale together with the executed 
Deed of Trust in the Promissory Note and Letter Agreement. 
(Ex. IP, Ex. 13D, Ex. 14D) As we have stated earlier, 
the terms were so different that Nichols rejected them 
out-of-hand. 
Now, in the meantime, La Roe, Wholesale's agent, has 
taken possession of the Trust Deed, Letter Agreement, Hypoth-
ecation Agreement and Letter Agreement and simply had the 
Deed of Trust recorded without authorization of either 
Wholesale or Hendersons. 
There is no question but that there was no meeting 
of the minds of these parties and^ therefore, Wholesale 
is not entitled to the benefits of tjie Deed of Trust since 
no contract could have existed between the parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRUST DEED IS INVALID SItfCE IT FAILS 
FOR A LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
-19-
Any contract to be binding must bind each party to 
give some legal consideration to the other by conferring 
a benefit upon him or suffering a legal detriment at his 
request. Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P. 2d 177, 11 Utah 2d 433. 
Likewise, the consideration required to sustain a 
mortgage is the same as that required to sustain a contract. 
Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose ChapeL Mortuary, Inc., 514 
P. 2d 594, 95 Idaho 599; Orchard v. Hughes, 1 Wall (U.S.) 
73, 17 L.Ed. 560; Norris v. Heald, 29 P. 1121, 12 Mont. 
282; Turner v. Porter, 264 111. App. 15. The record here 
is devoid of any evidence which would tend to show that 
any consideration was given in the transaction which led 
to the filing of the subject Trust Deed. Had Wholesale 
accepted the terms and conditions set forth in the Promissory 
Note and Letter Agreement tendered by Henderson, certainly 
consideration would have existed, however, those terms 
and conditions were not accepted. 
Of course, Mr. Nichols in his testimony tried to indi-
cate that the consideration for the Deed of Trust was the 
trip to Hawaii (TR-82), it seems that Mr. Henderson had 
won that trip as early as January 25, 1983, when Mr. Nichols 
wrote him announcing that he had won the Hawaii contest. 
(Ex. 21D) 
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Respondent may try to say that no written evidence 
such a note is necessary to sustain a mortgage (Trust Deed) 
where an obligation exists between mottgagor and mortgagee, 
however, the existence of the obligation is an essential 
element of a mortgage and, of coursief a mortgage had no 
efficacy if not accompanied by a debt. Shriver v. Simsy 
127 Neb. 374, 255 N.W. 60, 94 ALR 779; Gassert v. Bogk, 
19 P. 281, and 7 Mont. 585; Bangert^r v. Poulton, 663 P. 
2d 100 (1983). 
The obligation which was to be secured by the Deed 
of Trust was an obligation of Roy Henderson Tire not Roy 
Henderson or Janis Henderson. The property which was to 
act as the collateral security was not owned by Roy Henderson 
Tire, Inc. but was owned by Roy and Janis Henderson. 
Granted, John La Roe indicated that there were personal 
guarantees received from Roy Henderson and his wife, however, 
there is nothing other than his testimony in the record 
which would indicate that such a guarantee existed nor 
the terms of such a guarantee. Of bourse, La Roe further 
testified that Wholesale was seeking a more detailed personal 
guarantee from Roy Henderson and hi$ wife and, of course, 
they were also seeking collateral security. (TR 10-11) 
Therefore, no debt existed as between Roy and Janis Henderson 
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and Wholesale and, therefore, there was no consideration 
paid or extracted and the transaction and Deed of Trust 
must fail. 
POINT IV 
THE SUBJECT DEED OF TRUST FAILS FOR LACK 
OF DELIVERY. 
Delivery of a mortgage by mortgagor and acceptance 
by the mortgagee is essential before the mortgage can be 
of any effect. Shirley v. Burch, 18 P. 251, 16 Or. 83; 
Lee v. Fletcher, 46 Minn. 49, 4 8 NW 4 56; Wixom v. Ingham, 
515 P. 2d 606, 21 Ariz. App. 65. 
Appellants1 must concede that the Trust Deed came 
under the control of Wholesale, however, this delivery 
was conditional at best. Henderson intended that the trans-
action to be completed would consist of all of the terms 
and conditions set forth not only in the Deed of Trust 
but the Promissory Note and Letter Agreement. (Ex. IP 
& Ex. 13D-14D) 
It was not the intent of Henderson that in giving 
John La Roe the Deed of Trust that the requirement of deli-
very be satisfied but rather Henderson was tendering the 
Deed of Trust conditioned upon Wholesale accepting the 
other terms contained in the accompanying documents. The 
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intent of the mortgagor that there be delivery is essen-
tial. See Gorham v. Meacham, 63 Vt. 321, 22 A 572. Here, 
that intent is non-existent and therefore once again and 
for one further reason the Deed of Trust fails. 
POINT V 
THAT TIJE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES. 
The lower court assessed damages at $1,600.00 per 
month being the reasonable monthly rental for the premises. 
At the sam^ time, however, the Courlt allowed offsets for 
amounts which the Defendants were paying to superior and 
underlying trust deed holders. The amount of the offsets 
were equal to or greater than the tptal amount of damages 
and had the Court allowed the off$et prior to trebling 
the damages, then there would have be^n little or no amounts 
of damages to be trebled. 
It is, therefore, submitted that if Plaintiff's Trust 
Deed is upheld, that the damages awarded be reduced accord-
ingly. 
C O N C L U S I O j N 
The Respondent, Wholesale, macfte a valiant attempt 
to show th^t Henderson gave John L$. Roe a Deed of Trust 
and that it was Henderson's intent that Wholesale file 
it and thereby he would be bound by ifts terms and all statu-
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tory implications. To uphold such a position the court 
below had to ignore the evidence relating to the conduct 
of the parties and the circumstances surrounding Wholesale's 
receipt of the Deed of Trust. Realizing that the Record 
is a cold, lifeless document, nevertheless, it clearly 
indicates that Henderson intended to tender the Deed of 
Trust conditioned upon Wholesale's acceptance of certain 
other terms and conditions. When Wholesale did not accept 
the other terms and conditions, the transaction and the 
Deed of Trust failed. 
Additionally, the Deed of Trust would fail since there 
was no meeting of the minds it lacked consideration and 
lacked delivery and, therefore, based on these reasons, 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
title should be quited to the subject property in the defen-
dants, Michael Billis, Pat Billis and Richard Goodhand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of January, 1985. 
JOHN C. GREEN 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
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